		Day 1			
	Date/Time	Location	Туре	Title	Papers
1	August 24, 08:30-09:30	Conference Hall	plenary		1
2	August 24, 09:50-11:50	Room A	Contributed	1-A	4
3	August 24, 09:50-11:50	Room B	Contributed	1-B	4
4	August 24, 09:50-11:50	Room C	Contributed	1-C	4
		Lunch time			
5	August 24, 12:15-13:15	Room X	poster	1-0	
6	August 24, 13:15-14:15	Conference Hall	plenary		1
7	August 24, 14:20-15:50	Room A	Contributed	2-A	3
8	August 24, 14:20-15:50	Room B	Contributed	2-B	3
9	August 24, 14:20-15:50	Room C	Contributed	2-C	3
			1		
10	August 24, 16:00-17:30	Room A	Contributed	3-A	3
11	August 24, 16:00-17:30	Room B	Contributed	3-B	3
12	August 24, 16:00-17:30	Room C	Contributed	3-C	3
		Day 2			
13	August 25, 08:30-10:00	Room A	Contributed	4-A	3
14	August 25, 08:30-10:00	Room B	Contributed	4-B	3
15	August 25, 08:30-10:00	Room C	Contributed	4-C	3
16	August 25, 08:30-10:00	Room D	Contributed	4-D	3
17	August 25, 10:15-11:45	Room A	Contributed	5-A	3
18	August 25, 10:15-11:45	Room B	Contributed	5-B	3

August 25, 10:15-11:45	Room C	Contributed	5-C	3		
August 25, 10:15-11:45	Room D	Contributed	5-D	3		
August 25, 10:15-11:45	Room E	Contributed	5-E	3		
11:45-12:15 Lunch						
August 25, 12:15-13:15	Room X	poster	2-0			
August 25, 13:15-14:15	Conference Hall	plenary		1		
August 25, 14:20-15:50	Room A	Contributed	6-A	3		
August 25, 14:20-15:50	Room B	Contributed	6-B	3		
August 25, 14:20-15:50	Room C	Contributed	6-C	3		
August 25, 14:20-15:50	Room D	Contributed	6-D	3		
			L			
August 25, 16:00-17:30	Room A	Contributed	7-A	3		
August 25, 16:00-17:30	Room B	Contributed	7-B	3		
August 25, 16:00-17:30	Room C	Contributed	7-C	3		
August 25, 16:00-17:30	Room D	Contributed	7-D	3		
August 25, 16:00-17:30	Room E	Contributed	7-E	3		
August 25, 17:35-18:35	Conference Hall	plenary		1		
	10:15-11:45 August 25, 10:15-11:45 August 25, 10:15-11:45 August 25, 12:15-13:15 August 25, 13:15-14:15 August 25, 14:20-15:50 August 25, 14:20-15:50 August 25, 14:20-15:50 August 25, 14:20-15:50 August 25, 16:00-17:30 August 25, 16:00-17:30 August 25, 16:00-17:30 August 25, 16:00-17:30 August 25, 16:00-17:30 August 25, 16:00-17:30 August 25, 16:00-17:30 August 25, 16:00-17:30	Norm C Room C 10:15-11:45 Room D August 25, 10:15-11:45 Room E August 25, 10:15-11:45 11:45-12:15 Lu August 25, 12:15-13:15 Room X August 25, 13:15-14:15 Conference Hall August 25, 14:20-15:50 Room C August 25, 14:20-15:50 Room C August 25, 14:20-15:50 Room C August 25, 14:20-15:50 Room D August 25, 14:20-15:50 Room C August 25, 16:00-17:30 Room A August 25, 16:00-17:30 Room A August 25, 16:00-17:30 Room B August 25, 16:00-17:30 Room D August 25, 16:00-17:30 Room D August 25, 16:00-17:30 Room D August 25, 16:00-17:30 Room D August 25, 16:00-17:30 Room E	10:15-11:45Room CContributedAugust 25, 10:15-11:45Room DContributedAugust 25, 10:15-11:45Room EContributedAugust 25, 12:15-13:15Room XposterAugust 25, 13:15-14:15Conference Hall PlenaryplenaryAugust 25, 14:20-15:50Room AContributedAugust 25, 14:20-15:50Room BContributedAugust 25, 14:20-15:50Room CContributedAugust 25, 14:20-15:50Room CContributedAugust 25, 14:20-15:50Room CContributedAugust 25, 14:20-15:50Room CContributedAugust 25, 14:20-15:50Room CContributedAugust 25, 16:00-17:30Room AContributedAugust 25, 16:00-17:30Room BContributedAugust 25, 16:00-17:30Room CContributedAugust 25, 16:00-17:30Room CContributedAugust 25, 16:00-17:30Room DContributedAugust 25, 16:00-17:30Room DContributedAugust 25, 16:00-17:30Room DContributedAugust 25, 16:00-17:30Room EContributedAugust 25, 16:00-17:30Room EContributed	10:15-11:45Room CContributed5-CAugust 25, 10:15-11:45Room DContributed5-DAugust 25, 10:15-11:45Room EContributed5-E10:15-11:45I1:45-12:15 Lunch5-EAugust 25, 12:15-13:15Room Xposter2-0August 25, 13:15-14:15Conference Hallplenary-August 25, 14:20-15:50Room AContributed6-AAugust 25, 14:20-15:50Room BContributed6-BAugust 25, 14:20-15:50Room CContributed6-CAugust 25, 14:20-15:50Room CContributed6-DAugust 25, 14:20-15:50Room CContributed6-DAugust 25, 14:20-15:50Room CContributed7-AAugust 25, 16:00-17:30Room AContributed7-AAugust 25, 16:00-17:30Room CContributed7-BAugust 25, 16:00-17:30Room DContributed7-CAugust 25, 16:00-17:30Room DContributed7-DAugust 25, 16:00-17:30Room DContributed7-DAugust 25, 16:00-17:30Room DContributed7-DAugust 25, 16:00-17:30Room EContributed7-EAugust 25, 16:00-17:30Room EContributed7-E		

Session arrangement will be subject to minor changes.

Plenary Sessions:

1, **Matthew Jackson** (Stanford University), *Repeated Games and Favor Exchange on Social Networks*, August 24, 08:30-09:30

2, **Martin Shubik** (Yale University), (availability to be confirmed) August 24, 13:15-14:15

3, **Shmuel Zamir** (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem), *The Condorcet Jury Theorem: the Dependent Case*, August 25, 13:15-14:15

4, **William Thomson** (University of Rochester), *On the Adjudication of Conflicting Claims*, August 25, 17:35-18:35

Session 1-A: Solutions (I)

Session Chair: Yukihiko Funaki Date: Time: Location:

Fair-ranking properties of a core selection and the Shapley value

By Youngsub Chun, Seoul National University, and Boram Park, Seoul National University Presented by: Boram Park, Seoul National University

On the nucleolus for 2-convex TU games By Theo Driessen, University of Twente Presented by: <u>Theo Driessen</u>, University of Twente

A Non-cooperative and an Axiomatic Characterization of the AL-value

By Yukihiko Funaki, Waseda University, Takumi Kongo Graduate School of Economics, Waseda University, Rodica Branzei, Alexandru Ioan Cuza'' University and Stef Tijs Tilburg University Presented by: Yukihiko Funaki, Waseda University

Matrix analysis for the Owen value

By Genjiu Xu, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Hui Wang, Northwestern Polytechnical University, and Hao Sun, Northwestern Polytechnical University Presented by: <u>Genjiu Xu</u>, Northwestern Polytechnical University

Session 1-B: IO I Session Chair: Shigeo Muto Date: Time: Location:

Oligopoly Models

By Ferenc Szidarovszky and Feiyue Wang, Systems and Industrial Engineering Department University of ArizonaTucson, Arizona Presented by: <u>Ferenc Szidarovszky</u> Systems and Industrial Engineering Department University of ArizonaTucson, Arizona Branching deregulation and merger optimality

By Antonio J Morales, Universidad de Malaga and LINEEX, Miguel A Melendez-jimenez, Universidad de Malaga, and Ana Lozano-vivas, Universidad de Malaga

Presented by: Antonio J Morales, Universidad de Malaga and LINEEX

Fee versus royalty policy in licensing through bargaining: An application of the Nash bargaining solution

By Shigeo Muto, Tokyo Institute of Technology, and Shin Kishimoto, Tokyo Institute of Technology

Presented by: Shigeo Muto, Tokyo Institute of Technology

On the Stability of the Cournot Solution: An Evolutionary Approach By Marius-ionut Ochea, CentER, Dept. of Economics, Tilburg University Presented by: <u>Marius-ionut Ochea</u>, CentER, Dept. of Economics, Tilburg University

Session 1-C: Social Choice I

Session Chair: Maurice Salles Date: Time: Location:

<u>Are incentives against justice?</u> (withdrawn) By Rodrigo A. Velez, Texas A&M University Presented by: <u>Rodrigo A. Velez</u>, Texas A&M University

Bargaining Models with Arbitration Committee

By Vladimir Mazalov, Institute of Applied Mathematical Research and Yulia Tokareva, Zabaikalsky State Humanitarian Pedagogical University. Presented by: <u>Vladimir Mazalov</u> Institute of Applied Mathematical Research

Fuzzy Political Campaigns

By Ming Li, Concordia University and Arianna Degan University of Quebec at Montreal

Presented by: Ming Li, Concordia University,

Axiomatizations of a positional power score and measure for hierarchies

By Rene Van den brink, Department of Econometrics and Tinbergen Institute, Free University Amsterdam and Frank Steffen, University of Liverpool. Presented by: <u>Rene Van den brink</u>, Department of Econometrics and Tinbergen Institute, Free University Amsterdam Session: Posters I Date: Time: Location:

Trading Frequency and Volatility Clustering

By Yi Xue, school of international trade and economics, University of international business and economics, and Ramazan Gencay, Simon Fraser University Presented by: <u>Yi Xue</u>, school of international trade and economics, University of international business and economics

Strategies in Repeated Plays --- Expert Selection Problem

By Mingfei Li, Bentley University Presented by: <u>Mingfei Li</u>, Bentley University

Myopia in Contest: Accumulating Valuation All-Pay Auction Model and Experiment

By Zemin Zhong, HSBC School of Business, Peking University, and Fangfang Tang, National School of Development, Peking University Presented by: Zemin Zhong, HSBC School of Business, Peking University

Evolutionary game theoretical analysis of persistence of discrepancy between attitude and behavior

By Takuya Sekiguchi, Tokyo Institute of Technology Presented by: <u>Takuya Sekiguchi</u>, Tokyo Institute of Technology

Strategic Correlativity in Games

By John Wu, Business School, East China Normal University Presented by: John Wu, Business School, East China Normal University

<u>Time-consistent solutions in dynamic network games</u> By Artem Sedakov, St. Petersburg University, and Leon Petrosyan, St. Petersburg University Presented by: Artem Sedakov, St. Petersburg University Session 2-A: Solutions (II) Session Chair: <u>Chih Chang</u> Date: Time: Location:

Marginal monotonicity solution of NTU games

By Yan-an Hwang Department of Mathematics, National Dong Hwa University Presented by: <u>Yan-an Hwang</u> Department of Mathematics, National Dong Hwa University

Balanced consistency and balanced cost reduction for sequencing problems

By Rene Van den brink, Department of Econometrics and Tinbergen Institute, Free University Amsterdam and Youngsub Chun, Seoul National University Presented by: <u>Youngsub Chun</u> Seoul National University

On the coincidence property

By Chih Chang, National Tsing Hua University Presented by: <u>Chih Chang</u>, National Tsing Hua University

Session 2-B: Repeated Games

Session Chair: Bo Chen Date: Time: Location:

A Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Unequal Discounting

By Bo Chen, Department of Economics, Southern Methodist University, and Satoru Takahashi, Department of Economics, Princeton University Presented by: <u>Bo Chen</u>, Department of Economics, Southern Methodist University

Repeated anonymous random matching games: community enforcement beyond the prisoner's dilemma

By Julio Gonzalez-diaz, University of Santiago de Compostela and Joyee Deb, New York University

Presented by: Julio Gonzalez-diaz, University of Santiago de Compostela

Optimal yardstick rules under infinitely repeated competition

By Brett Graham, Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics, and Yafeng Wang, Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics Presented by: Brett Graham, Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics

Session 2-C: Information and Incentives

Session Chair: Chenghu Ma Date: Time: Location:

Aggregation and (Constrained) Optimal Risk Sharing Rule in Incomplete Market

By Chenghu Ma, School of Management, Fudan University, and Jiankang Zhang, Carleton University Presented by: <u>Chenghu Ma</u>, School of Management, Fudan University

Transfer of authority within hierarchy

By Pinghan Liang, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona Presented by: <u>Pinghan Liang</u>, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona

Envy-free and incentive compatible division of a commodity By Jung You, Rice University Presented by: Jung You, Rice University

Session 3-A: Rationality I

Session Chair: Jeff Kline Date: Time: Location:

Learning the new from reviewing the familiar

By Yiqing Xing, China Center for Economic Research, Peking University Presented by: <u>Yiqing Xing</u>, China Center for Economic Research, Peking University

Almost common priors By Ziv Hellman, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Presented by: <u>Ziv Hellman</u>, Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Transpersonal understanding through social roles, and emergence of cooperation By Jeff Kline, University of Queensland Presented by: Jeff Kline, University of Queensland

Session 3-B: Coalitional Games I

Session Chair: <u>David Wettstein</u> Date: Time: Location:

Coalitional Stochastic Stability

By Jonathan Newton, University of Cambridge Presented by: Jonathan Newton, University of Cambridge

Bargaining, Values and Implementation with Coalitional Externalities By David Wettstein, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Peter Borm, Tilburg University and Yuan Ju York University Presented by: David Wettstein, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev

Power indices expressed in terms of minimal winning coalitions

By Fabien Lange, Keleti Faculty of Economics and László A. Kóczy, Keleti Faculty of Economics Presented by: Fabien Lange, Keleti Faculty of Economics

Session 3-C: Matching

Session Chair: Yuichiro Kamada Date: Time: Location:

Equitability in Matching Market Design with an Application to School Choice By Yusuke Narita, University of Tokyo, and Kentaro Tomoeda, Harvard University and University of Tokyo Presented by: <u>Yusuke Narita</u>, University of Tokyo

Improving Efficiency in Matching Markets with Regional Caps: The Case of Japanese Resident Matching Program By Yuichiro Kamada, Harvard University, and Fuhito Kojima, Stanford University Presented by: Yuichiro Kamada, Harvard University

<u>Unanimity, Strategy-proofness, and Non-bossiness in Two-sided Matching Problems</u> By Takumi Kongo, Waseda University Presented by: <u>Takumi Kongo</u>, Waseda University

Session 4-A: Coalitional Games II

Session Chair: <u>Yuntong Wang</u> Date: Time: Location:

The Detalization of the Irrational Behavior Proof Condition for the Emission Reduction Game_

By Leon Petrosyan, St. Petersburg University, David w. k. Yeung, Hong Kong Shue Yan University and Anna v. Iljina, St. Petersburg University. Presented by: <u>Leon Petrosyan</u>, St. Petersburg University

Highway toll pricing

By Guixia Guo, Peking University, Baomin Dong, University of International Business and Economics, and Yuntong Wang, University of Windsor Presented by: <u>Guixia Guo</u>, Peking University

Efficient allocation of water with incomplete information

By Yuntong Wang, University of Windsor and Hu Lu Health Canada Presented by: <u>Yuntong Wang</u>, University of Windsor

Partial cooperative equilibrium models and applications to international environmental agreements

By Lina Mallozzi, University of Naples Federico II and Stef H. Tijs, University of Tilburg

Presented by: Lina Mallozzi, University of Naples Federico II

Session 4-B: Bargaining

Session Chair: Duozhe Li Date: Time: Location:

Noncooperative Foundation of Nash Bargaining Solution in n-Person Games with Incomplete Information

By Toshiji Miyakawa, Osaka University of Economics Presented by: <u>Toshiji Miyakawa</u>, Osaka University of Economics

<u>One-to-Many Bargaining with Endogenous Protocol</u> By Duozhe Li, Chinese University of Hong Kong Presented by: <u>Duozhe Li</u>, Chinese University of Hong Kong An NTU game approach to patent licensing: stable bargaining outcomes under two licensing policies By Shin Kishimoto, Tokyo Institute of Technology Presented by: Shin Kishimoto, Tokyo Institute of Technology

Session 4-C: Experimental I

Session Chair: Mamuro Kaneko Date: Time: Location:

An Experimental Study from the Perspective of Inductive Game Theory

By Mamoru Kaneko, University of Tsukuba, Institute of Policy and Planning Sciences, Ai Takeuchi, Waseda University, Yukihiko Funaki, Waseda University and J. Jude Kline, University of Queensland

Presented by: <u>Mamoru Kaneko</u>, University of Tsukuba, Institute of Policy and Planning Sciences

Reputation and Cooperation: An Experiment on Prisoner's Dilemma with Second-order Information

By Binglin Gong, Fudan University and Chunlei Yang, Academia Sinica Presented by: <u>Binglin Gong</u>, Fudan University

Stand by Me Help, Heterogeneity and Commitment in Experimental Coordination Games

By Enrique Fatas, University of Valencia , Jordi Brandts, Universitat Autónoma Barcelona and David J Cooper, Florida State University Presented by: <u>Enrique Fatas</u>, University of Valencia

Session 4-D: Bayesian Games

Session Chair: Cheng-zhong Qin Date: Time: Location:

An Explicit Approach to Modeling Finite-Order Type Spaces and Applications

By Cheng-zhong Qin, University of California at Santa Barbara, and Chun-lei Yang, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan Presented by: <u>Cheng-zhong Qin</u>, University of California at Santa Barbara Contracting with multiple agents, countervailing incentives, and industry structures By Shinji Kobayashi, Nihon University, and Shigemi Oba, Nihon University Presented by: <u>Shinji Kobayashi</u>, Nihon University

Existence of a pure strategy equilibrium in Markov games with strategic complementarities for finite actions and finite states By Takahiro Watanabe and Hideaki Yamashita, Tokyo Metropolitan University Presented by: <u>Takahiro Watanabe</u>, Tokyo Metropolitan University

Session 5-A: Coalition and Efficiency

Session Chair: Jingang Zhao Date: Time: Location:

Estimating the Costs of Forming a Coalition: Methodology and the Case of the 1887-1914 Sugar Monopoly By Jingang Zhao, University of Saskatchewan Presented by: Jingang Zhao University of Saskatchewan

The Motzkin's theorem and Pareto improving reforms By Kwan koo Yun, SUNY at Albany Presented by: <u>Kwan koo Yun</u>, SUNY at Albany

Vector Games

By Zhigang Cao and Xiaoguang Yang Academy of Mathematics and System Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences Presented by: <u>Zhigang Cao</u> Academy of Mathematics and System Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences

Session 5-B: Social Choice II (Cancelled)

Session Chair: Rene Van den Brink Date: Time: Location:

Session 5-C: Collective Decision Theory

Session Chair: <u>Chenghu Ma</u> Date: Time: Location:

Incomplete Contract and Divisional Structures

By Yongqin Wang, CCES, School of Economics, Fudan University and Te Bao CeNDEF, University of Amsterdam. Presented by: <u>Yongqin Wang</u>, CCES, School of Economics, Fudan University

The evolution of bilateral free trade agreement networks By Zhiwei Cui, Beihang University Presented by: <u>Zhiwei Cui</u>, Beihang University

<u>A Game Theoretic Analysis of China's Ongoing Land Institutional Change</u> By Chen Cheng, China Center for Economic Research PKU Presented by: <u>Chen Cheng</u>, China Center for Economic Research PKU

Session 5-D: IO II Session Chair: Andrey Garnaev Date: Time: Location:

Naive learning and game play in a dual social network framework By Zhengzheng Pan, Virginia Tech, and Robert P. Gilles, Queen's University, Belfast Presented by: <u>Zhengzheng Pan</u>, Virginia Tech

How to set tariff By Andrey Garnaev, Saint Petersburg State University Presented by: Andrey Garnaev, Saint Petersburg State University

Bargaining and collusion in a regulatory model By Mario Gilli, Department of Economics - University of Milan-Bicocca Presented by: <u>Mario Gilli</u>, Department of Economics - University of Milan-Bicocca

Session 5-B **IO III** Session Chair: Adam Wong Date: Time: Location: Fishy Gifts: Bribing with Shame and Guilt By David Ong, Peking University Presented by: David Ong, Peking University

Computational complexity of sequential pricing on social networks By Bach Ha, Northwestern University, Hai Zhou, Northwestern University Presented by: <u>Hai Zhou</u>, Northwestern University

<u>The choice of the number of varieties: justifying simple mechanisms</u> By Chi leung (adam) Wong Shanghai University of Finance and Economics Presented by: Chi leung (adam) Wong Shanghai University of Finance and Economics

Session: Posters II Date: Time: Location:

Multidimensional Connectivity and Cooperation

By Jose Vila, University of Valencia, Amparo Urbano, Universidad de Valencia, and Angel Sanchez, University Carlos III de Madrid Presented by: Jose Vila, University of Valencia

Situation distribution in a 3-Person game in form k(2b-2,2b-1,2b) and the game of 3 players gambling coins By Jiang Dianyu, Huaihai Institute of Technology Presented by: Jiang Dianyu, Huaihai Institute of Technology

Impact of Matching Uncertainty on Dynamic Stability of Equilibria By Ryota Iijima, Graduate School of Economics, the University of Tokyo Presented by: <u>Ryota Iijima</u>, Graduate School of Economics, the University of Tokyo

Payoffs Can be Inferred From Beliefs, Generically, When Beliefs Are Conditioned on Information

By Alia Gizatulina, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, and Martin Hellwig, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Presented by: <u>Alia Gizatulina</u>, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

<u>Global games with endogenous information structure----a rational inattention</u> <u>approach</u>

By Ming Yang, Dept. of Economics, Princeton University

Presented by: Ming Yang, Dept. of Economics, Princeton University

Network structure and the emergence of value

By Xu Tan, PHD student at Stanford University, and Tomas Rodriguez-barraquer, PHD student at Stanford University Presented by: <u>Xu Tan</u>, PHD student at Stanford University

The stronger player paradox

By Gabriel Julio Turbay, Former Research Director UNIVERSIDAD DEL ROSARIO Presented by: <u>Gabriel Julio Turbay</u>, Former Research Director UNIVERSIDAD DEL ROSARIO

On the non-traditional problems of portfolio theory

By Oleg Nikonov, Ural State Technical University-UPI, and Marina Medvedeva Ural State Technical University-UPI Presented by: <u>Nikonov</u>, Ural State Technical University-UPI

Money, fame, or just for the sake of it: a real-effort experiment on incentives for employee participation

By Fan Wu, University of Magdeburg, Birgitta Wolff, University of Magdeburg, and Silke Nagel, AOK Sachsen-Anhalt

Presented by: Fan Wu, University of Magdeburg

Session 6-A: Experimental II

Session Chair: Tatsuyoshi Saijo Date: Time: Location:

Theoretical and experimental investigation of performance of keyword auction <u>mechanisms</u>

By Emiko Fukuda, National Defense Academy of Japan, Yoshio Kamijo, Ai Takeuchi, Waseda University, Michiharu Masui, Tokyo Institute of Technology and Yukihiko Funaki Waseda University.

Presented by: Emiko Fukuda, National Defense Academy of Japan

<u>Reward distribution within a wining team</u> By Mingli Zheng, Univeristy of Macau Presented by: <u>Mingli Zheng</u>, Univeristy of Macau

A Solution to Prisoner's Dilemma: 100% Cooperation in the Experiment with Approval Stage

By Tatsuyoshi Saijo, Osaka University and UCLA Presented by: <u>Tatsuyoshi Saijo</u>, Osaka University and UCLA

Session 6-B: Coalitional Games IV

Session Chair: Yuan Ju Date: Time: Location:

Cooperative game theory based on Convex Analysis: The (Pre)Kernel and the Fenchel-Moreau Conjugation By Holger Ingmar Meinhardt, University of Karlsruhe Presented by: <u>Holger Ingmar Meinhardt</u>, University of Karlsruhe

Tolerable extreme and efficient compromise in negotiation with binary choice By Yuan Ju, University of York Presented by: Yuan Ju, University of York

Values for cycle-free directed graph games

By Anna Khmelnitskaya, St. Petersburg Institute for Economics and Mathematics, Russian Academy of Sciences, and Dolf Talman, Tilburg University Presented by: Anna Khmelnitskaya, St. Petersburg Institute for Economics and Mathematics, Russian Academy of Sciences

Session 6-C: Networks Session Chair: Rudolf Müller Date: Time: Location:

Communication, coordination and networks

By Jihong Lee, Yonsei university, and Syngjoo Choi, University College London Presented by: Jihong Lee, Yonsei university

<u>Strategic guanxi behavior in Chinese entrepreneurs: a network approach</u> By Ivan Arribas, University of Valencia, and José E Vila, University of Valencia Presented by: <u>Ivan Arribas</u>, University of Valencia

<u>Characterization of Separating Equilibria in a Signaling Game with a Continuum of</u> <u>Types: A Network Approach</u> By Rudolf Müller, Maastricht University, Jiwoong Lee, Maastricht University, and Dries Vermeulen, Maastricht University Presented by: Rudolf Müller, Maastricht University

Session 6-D: Rationality II

Session Chair: Ori Haimanko Date: Time: Location:

Continuity of the value and optimal strategies when common priors change By Ori Haimanko, Ben-Gurion University, Ezra Einy, Ben-Gurion University, and Biligbaatar Tumendemberel, SUNY at Stony Brook Presented by: Ori Haimanko, **Ben-Gurion University**

Individual Expectation, Limited Rationality and Aggregate Outcomes

By Te Bao, CeNDEF, School of Economics and Business, University of Amsterdam, Cars Hommes, Joep Sonnemans and Jan Tuinstra University of Amsterdam Presented by: Te Bao, CeNDEF, School of Economics and Business, University of Amsterdam

Purification, Saturation and the Exact Law of Large Numbers By Yongchao Zhang, National Univ. Singapore and Jianwei Wang, Univ. Science and Tech. China

Presented by: Yongchao Zhang, National Univ. Singapore

Session 7-A: Auctions and Contests Session Chair: Qian Jiao Date: Time: Location:

Myopia in Contest: Accumulating Valuation All-Pay Auction Model and Experiment By Zemin Zhong, HSBC School of Business, Peking University, and Fangfang Tang, National School of Development, Peking University Presented by: Zemin Zhong, HSBC School of Business, Peking University

Auctioning the right to play ultimatum games: the impact on equilibrium selection, strategic uncertainty and the structure of social preferences

By Jason Shachat, WISE, Xiamen University and J. Todd Swarthout, Georgia State University Presented by: Jason Shachat, WISE, Xiamen University

Contest design with endogenous entry: Disclosure of number of contestants and choice of contest technology

By Qian Jiao, National University of Singapore and Qiang Fu and Jingfeng Lu, National University of Singapore Presented by: Qian Jiao, National University of Singapore

Presented by: Qian Jiao, National University of Singapore

Session 7-B: Nash Program

Session Chair: Hans Peters Date: Time: Location:

Non-cooperative convergence to the core in Nash demand games without random errors or convexity assumptions By Jonathan Newton, University of Cambridge

Presented by: Jonathan Newton, University of Cambridge

Non-cooperative approaches to claims or bankruptcy problems By Hans Peters, Maastricht University Presented by: <u>Hans Peters</u>, Maastricht University

N-person cooperative games strategic-equilibrium

By Gabriel Julio Turbay, Former Research Director Universidad Del Rosario Presented by: <u>Gabriel Julio Turbay</u>, Former Research Director Universidad Del Rosario

Session 7-C: IO and Behavioral Session Chair: Qiang Fu Date: Time: Location:

Self-Esteem, Shame and Personal Motivation

By Xiaojian Zhao, University of Mannheim and Roberta Dessi, Toulouse School of Economics (GREMAQ and IDEI) and CEP Presented by: <u>Xiaojian Zhao</u>, University of Mannheim Can Forgetfullness Make Us Better Off?

By Jie Zheng, Washington University in St. Louis Presented by: <u>Jie Zheng</u>, Washington University in St. Louis

Policy Making with Reputation Concerns

By Qiang Fu, National University of Singapore and Ming Li, Concordia University. Presented by: <u>Qiang Fu</u>, National University of Singapore

Session 7-D: Solutions III

Session Chair: Marina Nunez Date: Time: Location:

<u>On the computation of the Shapley Value</u> By Irinel Chiril Dragan, University of Texas Presented by: <u>Irinel Chiril Dragan</u>, University of Texas

<u>Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions in the assignment market</u> By Marina Nunez, University of Barcelona, and Carles Rafels, Universitat de Barcelona Presented by: <u>Marina Nunez</u>, University of Barcelona

Competitive Outcomes and the Inner Core of NTU Market Games- An extension of the Results of Qin (1993)

By Sonja Brangewitz and Jan-Philip Gamp Economic Behavior & Interaction Models Presented by: <u>Sonja Brangewitz</u> and Jan-Philip Gamp Economic Behavior & Interaction Models

Session 7-E: Late submissions Session Chair: Date: Time: Location:

An existence result for farsighted stable sets of games in characteristic function form By Anindya Bhattacharya, UNIVERSITY OF YORK, and Victoria Brosi, University of York Presented by: <u>Anindya Bhattacharya</u>, UNIVERSITY OF YORK Assignment markets with the same core

Carles Rafels, University of Barcelona, Javier Martinez de albeniz University of Barcelona, Marina Nunez, University of Barcelona Presented by: <u>Carles Rafels</u>, University of Barcelona

Experimentation in an equilibrium labor market with Directed On-the-job Search

By Li Fei Universiity of Pennsylvania Presented by: Li Fei Universiity of Pennsylvania